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 ABSTRACT, KEYWORDS AND JEL CODES 
 
This dissertation examines the relationship between Worldwide Governance 
Indicators and Government Debt in 164 countries for the period between 2002 and 
2015. For this purpose, fixed effects (FE) and generalized method of moments (GMM) 
models are estimated. The results suggest that governance quality is negatively and 
statistically related with government debt. For Low Income countries was found 
evidence that better governance environment is associated with lower public debt levels.  
 
KEYWORDS: Governance Quality; Government Debt; Low Income countries; Panel 
Data Analysis; Worldwide Governance Indicators. 
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THE IMPACT OF GOVERNANCE IN GOVERNMENT DEBT 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years the world has witnessed an increase in public debt across countries, 
both developed and developing countries. More recently, the crisis of 2008 had a 
significant impact on budget deficits leading to sharp upward trend on government debt 
especially in some European countries like Portugal, Spain, Italy, Ireland and Greece. 
These continuous increases in debt ratios raised concerns in economic institutions 
concerning fiscal sustainability and its effect on world economy.  
Some studies such as Reinhart & Rogoff (2010a) suggested that low economic 
effect is associated with public debt thresholds above 90%; Checherita & Rother (2010) 
and Reinhart et al (2012) found similar evidence about this for different sets of 
countries. Concerning to debt-ratio impairs on growth, Reinhart & Rogoff (2008) argue 
that fiscal imbalances coming from banking crisis directly affects economic growth of 
advanced and emerging countries. Other lines of thought blame new phenomes such as 
population ageing for poor growth rates (Cecchetti et al, 2011). Finally, political 
polarization and partisanship has also been in discussion concerning to debt 
accumulation issues (Roubini & Sachs, 1989; Alesina & Perotti, 1995; Muller et al, 
2016). 
Nevertheless, a handful of studies have been developed about the relation between 
governance quality and government debt. On the one hand, a substantial part of these 
studies focused on the impact of corruption on public debt using World Governance 
Index (WGI) or Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) indicators as explanatory variables 
(Cooray et al, 2017). On the other hand, Ali & Ahmed (2017) uses all six-dimension 
WGI in their study to assess at what extent public debt is affected by governance quality 
in Middle East and North Africa countries. Also, Presbitero (2008) suggested that 
institutions quality has an important role in debt accumulation in low and middle-
income countries. In similar lines, Woo (2003) found evidence that fiscal stance is 
closely related with government institution quality as well as political and social 
stability.  




Following this, the objective of the present study is to assess the relation between 
governance quality and government debt reduction. To that end, the study uses the 
World Bank indicators of the WGI project. These aggregated governance indicators are 
a combination of related indicators that measure perceptions of corruption, rule of law, 
regulatory quality, voice and accountability and political stability and absence of 
violence/terrorism. Despite the critiques that were exposed by some authors (Arndt & 
Oman, 2006; Knack, 2006; Kurtz & Schrank, 2007; Thomas, 2009), this aggregation 
method has its advantages: cover a wider set of countries; permit cross-country analysis 
concerning governance; provide more precise governance measures (Kaufmann et al, 
1999b). Furthermore, the presence of margin errors (related with this aggregation 
procedure) does not consequently unable governance comparisons across countries or 
over time (Kaufmann et al, 2010). Indeed, Kaufmann et al (1999a) found evidence of a 
strong relation between better economic development results and efficient governance 
performance. 
In order to assess the relation between governance quality and government debt, the 
present study uses two regression techniques. The fixed effects (FE) and generalized 
method of moments (GMM) are estimated with data for 164 countries for the period of 
2002 and 2015. For robustness checks, the sample of countries is split into Low Income 
and High Income countries and empirical results are also presented for this 
specification. According to the aforementioned, the main contribution of this study for 
the existing literature is the analysis of the relation between governance indicators and 
debt accumulation for two opposite sets of countries: Low Income and High Income 
countries. This study also aims to give a deeper insight of the impact of each 
governance dimension (and their inter-relations) on government debt. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the related 
literature; Section 3 explains the dataset and the methodology adopted; Section 4 reports 
the empirical results; Section 5 presents the study conclusion, limitations and future 
suggestions for research.  
 
 




2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1. Government Debt and Economic Growth 
In the last decades government debt has been the focus of many economists research 
work. On the one hand, some studies focused on debt-growth relationship; on the other 
hand, little research has been concentrated on institution and governance quality 
associated with government debt and budget balance deficits. 
However, more common is to find studies about the importance and at what extent 
public debt influences the economic growth. Reinhart & Rogoff (2010a) explored the 
effects of high central government debt on economic growth as well as on inflation level 
for both advanced and emerging countries. Their main findings rely on the negative 
relation between growth and debt, meaning, public debt to GDP ratio above a 90% 
threshold is associated to a low economic growth on both sets of countries. Similarly 
conclusions were reached by Checherita & Rother (2010) and Reinhart et al (2012) for 
different sub-sets of countries. In particularly, Afonso & Alves (2014) found evidence 
about a negative impact of debt on growth in both short and long-term. In the same line 
of thought, high debt seems to impair growth for a certain threshold when exanimating 
industrial countries case according to Cecchetti et al (2011). The causality from growth-
to-debt accordingly to Reinhart & Rogoff (2008) is also directly affected by fiscal 
impacts associated to banking crises for advanced and emerging countries. A vast 
literature has found evidence that economic downturns lead to higher levels of debt to 
GDP ratios whether the source of it was a financial crisis or not (Reinhart & Rogoff, 
2010b).  
Figure 1 shows that, after the global crisis of 2008, public debt (% GDP) has 
experienced a large increase especially in advanced economies and, more specifically, 
in some European countries known as PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and 
Spain). Some authors such as Lane (2012) blame the design of euro as a consequence of 
the propagation of the European sovereign debt crisis as well as the lack of a banking 
union. Other views such as Evangelos (2014) claim that governance inefficiency and 
stresses could be on the origin of the destabilization of European Monetary Union. 




Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF) World Economic Outlook (2018) 
 
Cecchetti et al (2011) give credit to another issue: ageing is harshly increasing public 






The upward trend of population ageing is more evident in industrial countries 
making even more trickier engaging on policies to reduce public debt (and thus, 
worsening debt) as it also exacerbates lowers growth rates. In part this problem comes 
from development changes in population which put at risk the pension systems in 
developed countries: increasing in longevity, decreases in fertility rates and, finally, due 
to the retirement of baby-boom generation (Attanasio et al, 2007). Krueger & Ludwig 
(2007) also addresses this problem on their research and point out that the fast increase 
in population ageing in industrialized countries has a negative impact on the returns to 
the production factors capital and labour. This means that welfare is affected by 
increasing wages and declines on rates of return which can be soften with an increase in 
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FIGURE 1 – Government Debt across Countries. 
 




2.2. Fiscal Sustainability 
The continuous and persevering increase in government debt has sounded alarms 
about the fiscal sustainability and its consequences on the economic activity (Kim et al, 
2017). Even today there are different definitions and methods to assess debt 
sustainability as Neck & Sturm (2008) pointed out. It is common knowledge that 
sustainability of public finances had been discussed for several years in the last decades 
but still exists a lot of discomfort about it and especially about the explanation of the 
considerable cross-country differences. It is believed that economic arguments are not 
sufficient to explain public debt ratio differences across similar countries like OECD 
countries. Looking at an example of PIIGS countries again, Fincke & Greiner (2011) 
found to be the countries in Euro area who raised more concerns about debt 
sustainability in the last decades. The authors found evidence that Ireland, Portugal and 
Spain followed sustainable debt policies in last decades however for Greece the same 
does not apply.  
Some studies followed what is called the “Ricardian Equivalence” such as Barro 
(1979). The seminal work by Barro (1979) through tax smoothing theory1 showed that 
public debt and budget deficits could improve welfare and thus positively influence 
economic performance. This means that fiscal deficits rise when government spending 
is high, working as a buffer. Summarizing, the government (the social planner) should 
keep the tax rate constant. The present value of spending should equal the present value 
of taxes and that is how the level of taxes is determined (Alesina & Perotti, 1995). 
Notwithstanding, Woo (2003) criticizes Barro because is quite difficult to harmonize 
this view when deficits are very large and there are wide variations in countries.  
Other views state that the positive effect of debt has to do with egalitarian 
redistribution of the costs between generations. Public investment today will benefit 
future generations; therefore, the current cohort should not bear all the costs meaning 
that by issuing debt to sustain investment make future generations as contributors. Apart 
from this, Alesina (1988) argued that economic policy models cannot be disassociated 
from politics, highlighting the importance of the link between political competition and 
                                                 
1 Tax smoothing hypothesis states that public deficits management should allow tax rates to be 
constant in order to minimize the taxation burden overkill. Thus, revenues and deficits should finance 
normal expenditures when unanticipated spending occur (Fincke & Greiner, 2011). 




government debt. Moreover, Alesina & Perotti (1995) study reinforced this idea, 
summarizing other models that suggest a relation between debt accumulation and 
preference polarization, the effect of elections and also party competition.  
The party polarization problem is also investigated by Roubini & Sachs (1989) 
which stated that there was a clear evidence of larger deficits in governments with 
multiple political parties in the “ruling coalition”, for a certain period in time. More 
precisely, debt accumulation comes from postponed fiscal adjustments typically 
associated to weaker coalition governments. Nevertheless, this result was contested by 
De Hann & Sturm (1997) research which found that there is no positive association 
between government debt increases and power dispersion index used their work.  
Some authors associate left-wingers with higher spending in areas like social 
security and welfare which implies more public spending and ultimately higher deficits 
(Afonso & Guedes, 2016). Roubini & Sachs (1989) in their study also found evidence 
that supports the idea that left-wing parties are bigger spenders when compared to right-
wing governments or coalition governments. However, Muller et al (2016) in their 
results dissect this idea and show that left-wing governments tend to increase debt 
accumulation only during recessions unlikely right-wing ones. Indeed, right-wing 
governments are more leaning to adopt debt accumulation policies in “normal” times.  
 
2.3. Public Debt and Institutions Quality 
As aforementioned, there is a vast literature about the relationship between public 
debt and economic growth. Apart from it, little attention has been given to the 
importance of the institutions and good governance which are seen as fundamental to 
preserve a sustainable economic growth and a stable fiscal stance. Budgetary 
institutions produce effects on fiscal outcomes and, therefore, might explain cross-
country differences in debt accumulation (Alesina & Perotti, 1995). According to Kim 
et al (2017), good institutions reduce uncertainty for economic decision-makers leading 
to a better productivity. Also, Masuch et al. (2016) in their recent working paper argued 
that quality of institutions is crucial determinant of GDP per capita growth. The authors 
found evidence (for OECD countries) that good institution quality is a major instrument 
to smooth government debt since it allows a better management of government 




expenditures and thus ensuring economic growth sustainability. Another study that 
provides empirical results about debt-institutions relation is Cordella et al (2010). The 
authors argue that countries with a good institution and policy quality deal with debt 
overhang in much lower thresholds than on developing countries which perform bad 
policies and have inefficient institutions. Similarly, Kraay & Nehru (2006) studied the 
determinants of “debt distress” and found that countries with good policies are able to 
deal with debt levels three times higher than the ones who have the same “debt distress” 
problems. Following the same reality, results suggested by Presbitero (2008) 
demonstrate also that policies and institutions might have an effect either on debt 
accumulation and growth in Low and Middle-income countries. Woo (2003) goes 
beyond and argue that socio-political stability is fundamental to explain the existing 
differentiation on fiscal outcomes of countries, but government institutions have an 
important role on fiscal stance. 
As previous mentioned, a broad consensus has been stablished in recent years about 
the role of institutions on economic performance and government debt. Nonetheless, the 
measurement of this “good governance” and “institution quality” is not that linear. In 
the few literatures which takes into account these kind of themes, the majority of them 
use indices related to corruption measures as a proxy for good institutions. Several 
studies use CPI index published by Transparency International as a measurement of 
corruption where lower levels mean more corruption (Cooray et al, 2017); or use the 
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment Index (CPIA) where higher values are 
associated with a superior policy environment (Cordella et al, 2010).  
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the present study follows another strategy which 
does not only consider corruption but also other dimensions to determine what could be 
accounted as good governance and institution quality. Following Ali & Ahmed (2017) 
and Barisik & Baris (2017) studies, the present study uses the six worldwide 
governance indicators created under WGI project of the World Bank in order to assess 
their impact on government debt. 
 




2.4. Governance: Definition, Methodology and WGI 
Although various studies focus on the governance and its impact, the idea and the 
concept of governance is not clear and there is not a broad consensus about the 
definition. Several authors defined governance in a more embracing way, others 
presented more narrowly meanings. Nevertheless, Kaufmann et al (2010) work suggests 
an intermediate definition: governance is seen as “the traditions and institutions by 
which authority in a country is exercised”2.  
Kaufmann et al (1999a) constructed the first indicators covering three major areas 
measured: «the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced» 
capture by Voice and Accountability and Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism indices; «the capacity of the government to effectively formulate 
and implement sound policies», measured by Governance Effectiveness and Regulatory 
Quality indices; «the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern 
economic and social interactions among them» corresponding to the Rule of Law and 
Control of Corruption indices dimension. So, each area is measured by two governance 
indicators meaning that quality of governance is determined by six-dimension indexes 
as following: 
i. Voice and Accountability (VA) – capturing perceptions of the extent to 
which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their 
government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and 
independence of media.  
ii. Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism (PS) – capturing 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or 
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-
motivated violence and terrorism.  
iii. Government Effectiveness (GE) – capturing perceptions of the quality of 
public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such 
policies.  
                                                 
2 As firstly reported in Kaufmann et al (1999a) (p. 3). 




iv. Regulatory Quality (RQ) – capturing perceptions of the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that 
permit and promote private sector development.  
v. Rule of Law (RL) – capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality 
of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as 
the likelihood of crime and violence.  
vi. Control of Corruption (CC) – capturing perceptions of the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand 
forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private 
interests.  
In: Kaufmann et al (2010), p.3 
 
In what concerns to the governance database, the authors compiled a great number 
of governance measures from 33 different data sources which use different techniques 
and covering more than 200 countries. The sources of governance data are organized 
into two dimensions: according to the nature relatively to the measure techniques 
applied and according to the coverage, meaning, relatively to the representability of the 
countries covered. Data sources can either be from polls of experts or cross-country 
surveys. (Kaufmann et al, 1999a). Indicators based on surveys englobe the ones from 
both individuals and firms even as commercial rating agencies and public sector and 
non-governmental organizations3 (Kaufmann et al, 1999b). Both source types have their 
pros and cons. Polls of experts are useful once are specifically constructed for cross-
country comparison. However, as Kaufmann et al (1999a) reported, since countries 
rating depends on expert’s knowledge, the measurement can be biased. The surveys try 
to deal with this problem since they reflect opinions of individuals closely related with 
the country assessed. But, as well, has its disadvantages like being costlier than polls 
experts due to the difficulty in implementing them.  
                                                 
3 Data sources of all individual variables, their definitions and country scores are publicity available 
on the World Bank website: www.govindicators.org. 




Due to the asymmetry in country coverage and score ratings, all the individual 
sources are rescaled in order to be possible to do comparisons over time. Considering 
this fact, the authors constructed aggregated governance indicators (mentioned above) 
which takes into account these differences. The aggregation procedure called 
unobserved components model allows for meaningful aggregation across sources 
(Kaufmann et al, 1999a; 1999b; 2007b; 2010). This approach has the ability to put into 
common units all the data collected from the individual sources and uses a framework 
that allows a weighting of the indicators by their relative precision. In the end, the 
aggregated indicators are more informative about unobserved governance than the 
individual governance sources separately as Kaufmann et al (2007b) refer.  
Governance estimation measures follow a normal distribution with mean of zero and 
a standard deviation of one every period which implicate that governance scores be 
between -2.5 and 2.5, where lower scores mean worst ratings and, therefore, non-
desirable outcomes. Governance rankings instead are from 0 to 100 (percentile rank) 
across all countries covered. As consistently reported in Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi working papers, governance estimations are accompanied with margins of 
errors entirely attributable to the inevitable uncertainty related with governance 
measuring. With the wider coverage of countries and with the addition of new data 
sources to the aggregated indicators, margins of errors have substantially been reduced 
(Kaufmann et al, 2007b). It is of major importance to consider them when interpreting 
country scores, especially because small differences in country’s rankings are 
improbable to be statistically significant (Kaufmann et al, 1999b). However, this does 
not mean that the indicators cannot be used in cross-country comparisons (Kaufmann et 
al, 2010). 
Apart from all of these advantages cited above, some authors have criticized the 
WGI project. Critics stem from the lack of comparability, the construct validity and the 
reliability and comparability across countries as summarized by Arndt (2008). One 
criticism is that comparisons over time and across countries are not possible using WGI 
(Arndt & Oman, 2006; Knack, 2006). They state that when comparing two countries 
scores, governance estimations could have roots on different underlying sources. 
Kaufmann et al (2007a) in their working paper answer this critic arguing that despite the 
fact that could happen, the aggregation method used permit putting different underlying 




data sources in common units, thus enabling comparisons across countries. The fact that 
different data sources could measure different concepts of corruption does not seem to 
be a problem when comparing two countries scores. This might be true either because 
the aggregated indicator pulls out the common component from the underlying sources 
and distinct forms of a component measurement tend to be highly correlated among 
them. Following this response, Knack (2006) argument that may be more appropriate to 
use data from a single source rather than a composite index because of the loss of 
conceptual precision in aggregation seems to be inadequate. 
On the other hand, Kurtz & Schrank (2007) states that WGI suffer from potential 
perceptual and selection biases towards the firm/business’ views present on surveys. 
This fact might imply that firm answers about governance could divergence from the 
ones of common good defenders. Nevertheless, as stated in Kaufmann et al (2007a), the 
evidence that exists is quite robust, with correlations across all types of governance data 
sources. 
Another important question was raised by Thomas (2009) work is the “construct 
validity”. Thomas criticizes the WGI in the sense that they do not present a suitable 
definition for each of the six dimensions of governance, in other words, if WGI are 
valid measurements of what they are supposed to measure. According to the author, 
construct measure to be valid have to meet two points: have to represent the theoretical 
definition of the construct and there must be a one-to-one relationship between 
measurement proposed and the observable variables. Therefore, the argument of 
criticism is based on the non-evidence of construct validity. Despite this fact, Kaufmann 
et al (2007a) emphasis that governance definition is not consensual among the 
academia, therefore, the definitions for all the six dimensions are quite reasonable since 
their founded on some existing definitions and on understandings of the concepts. 
Regarding to the “discriminant” and “convergent” validity failure, the authors in their 
previous work4 demonstrated evidence that rejects these critics. 
 
                                                 
4 In the various World Bank working papers of Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2007a) demonstrate 
that the individual data sources of the WGI are highly correlated among them in every of the six 
governance indicators, thus “convergent” validity is meet. Since “discriminant” validity demands that 
cannot be present any correlation between all six governance indicators, this concept is not a convenient 
criterion to be considered. 




2.5. Government Debt and Governance Indicators 
Besides the critics that some authors have done to the WGI, the aggregated 
indicators can be used into studies which try to assess causes and consequences of 
governance in a wider country sample (Kaufmann et al, 1999b). Apart from the 
abundant literature on economic growth and governance relationship, little has been 
done concerning government debt and governance quality. In any case, should be 
analyzed whenever and at what extent governance indicators affect public debt.  
Some researches focused particularly on the effects of corruption on government 
debt accumulation. First empirical works appeared in the late 1990s, especially through 
Mauro (1995) research who found evidence that public investment is negatively affect 
by corruption which consequences extended to economic growth. So, corruption can 
broadly be seen as an impediment of economic development and growth. This is 
corroborated by Méon & Sekkat (2005) which found evidence about it by presenting 
results in favor of “sand the wheels” hypothesis5 in contrast with “grease the wheels” 
hypothesis which affirms that bad governance could be offset by corruption. Again, the 
authors found evidence of a positive association between corruption and public 
investment (Tanzi & Davoodi, 1997) where a deficient resource allocation is present on 
government spending (Mauro, 1998). A more insight look on Tanzi & Davoodi (1997) 
results, suggest that corruption reduces economic growth by decreasing government 
revenue through losses in tax revenues. Also, Al-Marhubi (2000) found statistical 
evidence of a positive association between corruption and inflation, also argue that tax 
evasion costs tend to be higher in more corrupt countries. This tax revenue reduction is 
intimately related with the expansion of shadow economy activity (Friedman et al, 
2000). Dreher & Schneider (2006) corroborates this finding by arguing that fiscal 
burden is negatively associated with unofficial activity for a 10% level of significance.  
The authors go further and present evidence that confirms a complementarity of shadow 
economy and corruption for Low Income countries. Actually, corruption do not allow 
governments to have an efficient tax collection and, therefore, permitting an upward 
trend in tax evasion. Furthermore, shadow economy diminishes the tax base and, 
consequently, even higher tax rates are imposed. This “mechanism” creates a vicious 
                                                 
5 Under this hypothesis, corruption is seen as harmful for growth and investment which effect could 
be magnified in the presence of bad governance quality (Méon & Sekkat, 2005). 




circle and, ultimately, leads to a worsening of economic growth, reduction of exports, 
hinders productivity and also hampers foreign direct investment (Kaufmann, 2010). 
Apart from this, corruption can also worsen government expenditure composition by 
decreasing education and health expenditures in favor to other investments (Mauro, 
1996; 1998). Suchlike conclusions are put forward by Delavallade (2006): government 
expenditure allocation is directly affected by corruption where the share of social 
expenditures is reduced in favor of public services and order. 
Following this corruption view, can be understood that, ultimately, corruption can 
be favorable to well-connected private individuals and, therefore, affecting income 
distribution. According to Gupta et al (2002) study, an increase in corruption lead to 
higher propensity to a reduction in social services at disposable to the poorest and, thus, 
increases poverty. The authors also believe that corruption is harmful to government 
income distribution since negatively affects human capital formation and human capital 
distribution. Consequently, economic growth suffers a downward impairing country’s 
fiscal stance. Finally, public expenditures can also be negatively affected by corruption 
through the adoption of riskier decisions over public debt composition which might lead 
to a more expensive debt servicing (Kaufmann, 2010). 
Many studies, the majority of them already identified on this study, have shown the 
negative effects and the channels through with corruption hamper growth and debt 
accumulation with a greater focus on developing countries (which are associated to bad 
governance). Nevertheless, this phenomenon is not entirely devoted to this cohort, 
Industrialized countries also suffer from high fiscal deficits and destabilized public 
finances. Kaufmann (2010), using WGI, emphasis that there is a dispersion between 
industrialized countries in controlling corruption. Moreover, found evidence of a highly 
correlation between corruption and fiscal deficits for the same sample of countries. 
Similar results were obtained by Cooray et al (2017) study when using WGI of 
corruption just like Kaufmann did. Authors state that corruption negatively affects 
public debt through an increase in government expenditure and shadow economy size.  
From these outcomes can be inferred that misgovernance and, more specific, 
corruption is not a problem exclusively of low income per capita countries but also of 




richer ones (Kaufmann, 2005). This fact leads to the first hypothesis under analysis: bad 
governance is associated with higher government debt. 
H1: Higher levels of government debt are associated with poor governance. 
 This imply that country’s government should be aware of the importance of 
governance on their fiscal stances and also that economic and financial institutions 
which cover both Low and High income countries should promote implementation of 
policies targeting better governance. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, contrasting views about this topic have been 
released. Actually, some studies claim that corruption can increase countries’ efficient 
in the presence of inefficient institutions. Méon & Weill (2010), using corruption and 
government effectiveness indexes of WGI project, found that corruption is less 
detrimental in countries with more ineffective institution quality. This may so because 
sometimes corruption could accelerate decision-process widely plagued with 
bureaucracies or either as form of trespassing a weak regulatory and institutional 
framework. Leff (1964) attributes importance to corruption in improving welfare and 
economic growth since may indulge economic development by enhancing higher rates 
of investment and promoting innovation. 
Another line of research was concerned about the other 5 governance indicators 
which have impact on government debt either through direct or indirect mechanisms. 
Kaufmann et al (2010) claim that WGI cannot be though as independent of each other 
and give the example that that less corruption could come from better accountability 
framework. Seems that all six-dimension governance indicators cannot be analysed 
independently, de facto, corruption and government effectiveness have close tights 
relations. As Tanzi & Davoodi (1997) refer, government becomes more inefficient on 
spending and investment function due to high levels of corruption. Not only country’s 
output performance but also politics contributes to the lack of effectiveness of 
governments. In fact, government debt deterioration is closely related with weak 
coalition governments (Roubini & Sachs, 1989). Alesina & Perotti (1995) work notes 
that coalition governments affect government effectiveness by the delaying the 
implementation of necessary fiscal adjustments to combat budget deficits. La Porta et al 
(1999) addresses this issue by claiming that there are differences between rich and poor 




countries concerning quality of public good provision and public sector efficiency. 
Government size is also emphasized as being positively associated in a better 
performance. Bigger government might imply higher costs inherent to it, however, the 
gain of efficiency on government management seems to have a wider effect on public 
debt (due to a higher collection of taxes, for example). Nonetheless, Méon & Sekkat 
(2005) believe that corruption might also be a consequence rather than a cause of 
government ineffectiveness. The authors state that corruption on investment increase 
due to ineffective governments’ decisions. 
As can be seen, there is no space for an analysis of government effectiveness 
without exploring rule of law determinants impact. This inter-relation was noted by 
Dreher & Schneider (2006) paper where authors have reasons to believe that a better 
rule of law and greater democracy can positively affect government effectiveness by 
substantially reducing corruption in a country. Unofficial activities, also known as 
shadow economy activities, tend to be smaller in countries with better rule of law and, 
thus, strengthening public finances according to Friedman et al (2000). Nevertheless, 
Weingast (2009) presents a contrasting view arguing that implementing and improving 
a better rule of law in developing countries tend to be harder that in developed 
countries.  
Another linkage is expressed by Kaufmann et al (2010) which states that better 
regulatory environment can be achieve through more effective governments. And how it 
affects government debt? Rules and regulations through which government budgets are 
design and implemented are a responsibility of budgetary institutions and they might 
explain the present of difference on debt across countries. Indeed, Alesina & Perotti 
(1995) found evidence that fiscal policy outcomes are influenced by budget institutions. 
Regulatory quality can enhance economic development, especially in some Low Income 
group of countries like in sub-Saharan Africa (Kaufmann, 2005). Good regulatory 
infrastructure promotes private sector development (Ali & Ahmed, 2017) but also 
productivity and public goods provision. Nevertheless, when there is room for over-
regulation and bureaucracies, shadow economy activities tend to develop (Friedman et 
al, 2000). Also, Kaufmann (2005) in his results found evidence for OECD countries that 
bureaucracy is a major hindrance for enterprise activity. This problematic could weaken 




government revenue, tax collection, country’s competitiveness and, therefore, 
negatively impacting government debt.  
Last but not least, Voice and Accountability and Rule of Law indexes: according to 
Kaufman et al (2010), more transparent and fair processes of choosing and replacing 
governments can be obtained by proper rule of law respect by citizens. Both developed 
and developing countries benefit in terms of tax performance by improving voice and 
accountability and control of corruption (Bird et al, 2008). Legit and responsive 
governments seem to be an important factor on indulging tax effort, meaning that good 
governance increases the predisposition of citizens and businesses to pay taxes. 
Notwithstanding, other study suggests that government debt could be negatively 
affected with improvements in Voice and Accountability of a country. Schultz & 
Weingast (2003) claimed that liberal governments normally have a greater access to 
credit comparing with illiberal governments which face a premium payment to obtain it 
leading to a credit rationing. The simple fact that government officials are constrained 
by limited government institutions increases the likelihood of debt repayment because 
electoral accountability in liberal countries have a greater power in punishing 
governments in the case of default. Consequently, state’s borrowing power is expanded, 
greater amount of loans is conceded to the country at low interest rates and, ultimately, 
government debt increases. In this latter case, political stability plays a key role. Indeed, 
sovereign loans tend to be larger in the presence of political instability for unconstrained 
regimes (Ozler & Tabellini, 1991). Moral hazard and perceiving country risk positively 
affect political instability which in turn might lead to a more expensive debt serving and 
an increase in demand for sovereign loans. 
Summarizing, the main goal of this study is to assess at what extent governance has 
an impact in government debt. Governance itself does not influence public debt in the 
same way on countries; therefore, we pretend to assess this fact by analysing two sets of 
countries: Low Income and High Income countries. Following this line of thought, 
Hypothesis 2 is that governance improvements have a greater impact on government 
debt in Low Income countries.  
H2: For Low Income countries, government debt is lower with a better governance 
environment.  




Source: WGI Scores obtained from WGI project of the World Bank; General government gross debt as proxy 
for Government Debt (from IMF database). 
 
Indeed, Figure 2 shows the negative correlation between government debt and 
governance. To the best of our knowledge, this empirical analysis between two opposite 




























FIGURE 2 – GOVERNANCE AND GOVERNMENT DEBT IN LOW INCOME COUNTRIES. 




3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.2. Data 
The data used in this study was collected from the World Bank (World Bank 
DataBank) as well as from International Monetary Fund (IMF DataMapper6) and 
Worldwide Governance Indicators database7. It covers the period between 2002 and 
2015 for a sample of 164 countries.  
The countries were divided into Low Income and High Income countries for 
robustness purposes, as presented in Table A.I. (Appendix section). The Low Income 
countries are those who present low per capita income measured by Gross National 
Income (GNI) per capita in US dollars, according to the World Bank classification, a 
threshold below $958. They can be classified as part of Developing countries. Inversely, 
High Income countries are those who have the highest thresholds of per capita income 
(above $12,056), previously called as “industrialized” countries. This income group 
division is mainly based on operational threshold for “civil work preference” (World 
Bank’s Data Help Desk). According to the World Bank Atlas method, GNI per capita is 
calculated and four groups are defined corresponding a certain threshold as previously 
described. Despite the fact that GNI per capita does not account for income distribution 
inequalities, has demonstrated to be a useful indicator when measuring some parameters 
that summarize a country’s level of development.  
 
3.2. Variables 
This study aims to assess the impact of governance in government debt. In order to 
quantify this impact, we use General Government Gross Debt (% GDP) as dependent 
variable. The main independent variables are the six-dimension governance quality 
indicators, constructed under the WGI project of the World Bank: Voice and 
Accountability (VA); Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism (PS); 
Governance Effectiveness (GE); Regulatory Quality (RQ); Rule of Law (RL); Control 
of Corruption (CC). Seven macroeconomic indicators are used as control variables in 
                                                 
6 Publish a vast selection of economic indicators through some datasets including the World 
Economic Outlook (April 2018) where the data for government debt was collected. 
7 WGI project reports aggregate and individual governance indicators in form of six dimensions for a 
period comprehended between 1996-2016.  




the specification model: GDP growth, unemployment rate, age dependency rate, trade 
openness, gross fixed capital formation, inflation and general government final 
consumption expenditure. 
 
3.2.1. Variables Definitions 
The dependent variable is General Government Gross Debt in percentage of gross 
domestic product (GDP) as a proxy for government debt. It is defined as consolidated 
general government gross debt at nominal value outstanding at the end of the year, 
according to the Maastricht Treaty.  It includes debt liabilities, currency and deposits, 
debt securities and loans. This set of data comes from the IMF database which has been 
widely used in other studies (e.g. Kim et al, 2017; Cooray et al, 2017). 
Governance can be defined «as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a 
country is exercised» as referred by Kaufmann et al (1999a). This kind of definition 
implies that governance itself includes: «the process by which governments are selected, 
monitored and replaced» capture by Voice and Accountability and Political Stability 
and Absence of Violence/Terrorism indices; «the capacity of the government to 
effectively formulate and implement sound policies», measured by Governance 
Effectiveness and Regulatory Quality indices; «the respect of citizens and the state for 
the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them» 
corresponding to the Rule of Law and Control of Corruption indices dimension 
(Kaufmann et al, 1999a; 2010).  
This study uses six measures of institution’s quality which were constructed under 
the WGI project of the World Bank. Recalling the their descriptions, we have: Control 
of Corruption (CC) which tries to quantify how «public power is exercised for private 
gain as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests»; Government 
Effectiveness (GE) concerns about the «perceptions of public service provision and 
bureaucracy quality, civil servants competence, civil service independence from 
political pressures and government’s credibility»; Regulatory Quality (RQ) index 
captures «perceptions of unfriendly market policies incidence and excessive regulation 
burden»; Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism (PS) concerns to the 
«perceptions measurement of the likelihood government destabilization and overthrown 




by violent or antidemocratic means»; Rule of Law (RL) measures to what extent 
«society rules are obeyed and trusted by the agents»; Voice and Accountability (VA) 
indicator measure «to what extent citizens are able to select a country government and 
have freedom of speech». Here the estimations range from (-2,5) to (2,5), with the lower 
values be representative of lower governance performance. More details about the 
underlying sources, aggregation method and their interpretation can also be found in the 
WGI methodology paper by Kaufmann et al (2010). 
The control variables that follow the related literature are: GDP per capita (current 
US$) which is used to measure the level of development of a country and to capture 
some socio-political effects (Cooray et al, 2017; Tanzi & Davoodi, 2002; Woo, 2003). 
Furthermore, whereby government consumption expenditure is directly affected by 
existing countries’ corruption (has a negative impact), then it is also taken into account 
in the empirical analysis as Gupta et al (2002) suggests. Accordingly, it is used General 
Government Final Consumption Expenditure as percentage of GDP (LOG_GGFCE) 
since could be seen as a macroeconomic variable that accounts for government 
spending, following Swamy (2015a) research. Public investment and foreign direct 
investment can be negatively influenced by corruption through different channels 
(Mauro, 1996, 1998; Kaufmann, 2010; Cooray et al, 2017; Kim et al, 2017; Tanzi & 
Davoodi, 1997). Therefore, other variable used in the model is Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation as percentage of GDP (LOG_GFCF) in an attempt to proxy fiscal policy 
which is representative of gross net investment. Unemployment (LOG_UNEM) which 
refers to the share of labour force that is available and seeking for a job but is not 
working is point out as been an important variable in what concerns to the debt-growth 
nexus (Swamy, 2015a; Cecchetti et al, 2011). Ali & Ahmed (2017) acknowledge that 
unemployment can be directly affected by corruption and other macroeconomic 
dimensions capture by the WGI leading to an increase in government debt. It is also 
included the rate of inflation (LOG_INF) measured by the consumer price index. As 
Woo (2003) presents, fiscal deficits are widely affected by inflation through multiple 
channels. Rising inflation is positively correlated with high nominal interest payments 
as well as with lower real tax revenues.  
The previous variables are subject to a log transformation in order to turn the data 
distribution less skewed (mechanism largely used in the related literature).  




Trade Openness is defined as the sum of exports and imports of goods and services 
measured as a share of GDP according to World Bank definition. Indeed, seems to be a 
relevant control variable once economies with higher levels of trade volume are 
associated with higher levels of external debt (Colombo & Longoni, 2009). Age 
Dependency Ratio (as % of working-age population) represented by the variable AGE is 
a measure of ageing and population structure which has a negative and statistically 
significant impact on growth which indirectly affects public debt (Cecchetti et al, 2011). 
Furthermore, the authors signalize that both industrialized and emerging countries (with 
some exceptions) are facing an upward trend on ageing turning it on an important 
variable when studying public debt in our sample. Data for all of these variables were 
collected from World Bank Database. 
Finally, there is a categorical variable for an income grouping in order to control for 
economic and institutional development factors. Good institution quality is believed to 
have a positive impact on government debt either through a better allocation of 
government expenditures financed by debt (Masuch et al, 2016) or through higher 
investment which enhances a sustainable economic growth (Kim et al, 2017) among 
other channels. This idea is supported by La Porta et al (1999) who found evidence that 
poor countries demonstrate inferior governance performance than rich ones. 
Accordingly, this work seeks to assess whether governance quality affect public debt of 
Low and High Income countries differently. In this way, dummies LOW_INC and 




This study uses a strongly balanced panel data of 164 countries between the period 
of 2002 and 2015. Some panel techniques are used to estimate the empirical model. 
There are some advantages in using this kind of empirical approach, as Afonso & Alves 
(2014) refer. The most important is that highlights the individual heterogeneity as well 
as some associated problems like missing data for some particular countries. To 
estimate the model is used panel Fixed Effects (FE) and the system General Method of 
Moments (GMM). Some issues arose when deciding whenever it would be adequate to 




do estimation through Fixed Effects (FE) or Random Effects (RE) method. As 
mentioned by Geller & Guedes (2017), FE could be better when testing within country 
variation. Moreover, FE seems to the best way to better estimate a model where omitted 
variables and explanatory variables are correlated, as shown in Afonso & Alves (2014) 
research. Nevertheless, through a RE model is also possible to deal with unobserved 
effects.  
In order to better reckon which specification test is more suitable was applied the 
Hausman Test as suggested by Hausman (1978). Based on the results of the Hausman 
Test, FE model appears to be the right one to use since the null hypothesis is reject. 
Otherwise, if it was accepted, RE model would be the most convenient to employ. Thus, 
this work only reports the results for FE estimations.  
Another recurrent problem when dealing with panel data analysis is endogeneity 
meaning that some explanatory variables are not completely exogenous. With the view 
to control for it and to avoid biased estimators, system GMM estimator is considered. 
Thus, the empirical model is also estimated by the GMM estimator. Despite the fact that 
could arise some issues in using GMM estimator with macroeconomic and cross-
country data, as cited by Presbitero (2008), it is shown that is a good estimator and there 
is a gain of efficiency on the results obtained. Also, GMM techniques seem to work 
properly when the number of panel units is large and the time scope small (Blundell & 
Bond, 1998).  
Therefore, the panel data model is represented by the equation (1): 
 
(1) 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿_𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽0𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +
𝛽𝛽5𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
  
where LOG_GovDebti,t is the government debt ratio to GDP terms for country i in the 
period t. X1i,t represents the vector of control variables (LOG_GGFCE; LOG_INF; 
LOG_GDP; LOG_GFCF; LOG_UNEM; AGE; TRADE). CCi,t, GEi,t, RQi,t, PSi,t, RLi,t, 
VAi,t are the variables that measures institutions’ quality designate as the World 
Governance Indicators. εi,t is a random error term which considers the possible effects 




of the omitted variables. α, β0, β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, and β6 are unknown coefficients to be 
estimated. 
Here, the research aims at ascertaining whether and to what extent the WGI 
indicators have an impact in government debt. In an initial stage, it is tested for the full 
sample of countries and with no introduction of categorical variables, testing the 
Hypothesis 1.  
To better stand out the impact of governance quality on government debt, was built 
an index of overall governance indicators (an aggregation, merely representative). This 
aggregation was built through a multivariate technique called Principal Component 
Analysis8 (PCA) which transforms several correlated variables into a smaller set of 
uncorrelated variables (Jackson, 1991). PCA approach uses a linear combination of a set 
of variables to create the index. Mathematically can be represented as follow: 
 
(2)  𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊_𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = �∑ 𝐰𝐰𝑗𝑗𝒛𝒛𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗=1 �𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  (i=1,…,n); (j=1,…,k) 
 
where WGI_INDEXi,t is the governance quality scores for country i in the period t. wj 
represents the vector of weights of each vector z which contain the six WGI,  for each 
country i for the period t. 
 
Recalling the aforementioned, this modification on the model is given by:  
 
(3)  𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿_𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽0𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊_𝑊𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (i=1,…,n) 
 
where LOG_GovDebti,t is the government debt ratio to GDP terms for country i in the 
period t. X1i,t represents the vector of control variables (LOG_GGFCE; LOG_INF; 
LOG_GDP; LOG_GFCF; LOG_UNEM; AGE; TRADE). WGI_INDEXi,t is the index 
                                                 
8 This technique was created in 1901 by Karl Pearson and later developed by Harold Hotelling in 
1930s. This aggregation method was constructed in STATA 13.1. statistical programme. 




that includes all of the six measures of institutions’ quality. εi,t is a random error term 
which considers the possible effects of the omitted variables.  
 
Thereupon, the sample is split into Low Income and High Income countries. Two 
regressions were constructed, one for each set of countries using the dummy variable 
LOW_INC (equation 4) and using the dummy HIGH_INC (equation 5). Control 
variables used are the same of the previous model specification. In this way can be 
assessed whether governance indicators are more relevant on improving government 
debt thresholds in countries with low per capita income comparing with the richest 
countries. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 – government debt level of Low Income countries 
benefit from a better governance performance – is verified. Developing an empirical 
model with these specifications can be seen as the main contribution of this research for 
the existing literature on this subject. The next equation describes how the specification 
model for the Low Income countries is constructed: 
 
 
 (4) 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿_𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽0𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +
𝛽𝛽5𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (i∈ Low Income countries) 
 
 
where LOG_GovDebti,t is the government debt ratio to GDP terms for country i (which 
belongs to the subset of countries with low per capita income) in the period t. X1i,t 
represents the vector of control variables (LOG_GGFCE; LOG_INF; LOG_GDP; 
LOG_GFCF; LOG_UNEM; AGE; TRADE). CCi,t, GEi,t, RQi,t, PSi,t, RLi,t, VAi,t are the 
variables that measures institutions’ quality designate as the World Governance 








Equation (5) represents the baseline model for the other subsample of countries, 
High Income ones:  
 
(5) 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿_𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽0𝑋𝑋1𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 +
𝛽𝛽5𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 (j∈ High Income countries) 
 
where LOG_GovDebtj,t is the government debt ratio to GDP terms for country j (which 
belongs to the subset of countries with the highest per capita income) in the period t. 
X1j,t represents the vector of control variables (LOG_GGFCE; LOG_INF; LOG_GDP; 
LOG_GFCF; LOG_UNEM; AGE; TRADE). CCj,t, GEj,t, RQj,t, PSj,t, RLj,t, VAj,t are the 
variables that measures institutions’ quality designate as the World Governance 
Indicators. εi,t is a random error term which considers the possible effects of the omitted 
variables. 




4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
4.1. Results 
Table I presents descriptive statistics for all variables. Taking a glance on 
Government Debt minimum and maximum values can be said that there is a quite big 
disparity between all countries, an outcome more a less expected since our sample 
includes both low per capita income countries and high income ones. This heterogeneity 
among countries is also present in Inflation. It is believed that this divergence has roots 
in different national central bank’s views about inflation rate level. With regard to the 
governance indicators, Political Stability appears to be the one with lowest score where 
negative levels mean worst governance quality. Episodes of terrorism, democratic 
revolutionary events and civil wars in recent years all over the world may be the source 
of such low scores. Undoubtedly, Government Effectiveness and Regulatory Quality 
have a significant deviation between the lowest and highest score. 
 
TABLE I 
VARIABLES DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
  Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
LOG_GovDebt 1.5873    0.3311   -0.3116    2.7109 
LOG_GGFCE 1.1639    0.1578    0.4371    1.5847 
LOG_INF 0.5912    0.4600   -3.2109    4.3876 
LOG_GDP 3.9341    0.5308    2.6366    5.0108 
LOG_GFCF 1.3443    0.1464    0.3473    2.0597 
LOG_UNEM 0.8007    0.3339   -0.7959    1.5711 
AGE 60.9886         18.4404  16.4518 111.6156 
TRADE 89.4835  51.3867    0.1750 441.6038 
CC 0.0332    1.0282   -1.7728    2.4700 
GE 0.0183    0.9899   -2.0415    2.4370 
RQ 0.0528    0.9337   -2.2444    2.2335 
PS 0.1476    0.9565   -2.8273    1.6881 
RL 0.0481    1.0003   -1.9163    2.1003 
VA 0.0312    0.9589   -2.0674    1.8010 
 
  








Table II presents the correlation matrix. The correlation between WGI variables are 
highly positive and statistically significant. As noted by Kaufmann et al (2010), this 
strong positively correlation shows that governance indicators cannot be thought as 
being independent of each other. Interactions arise in very different ways, for example: 
good accountability mechanisms are an important tool to reduce corruption or a sound 
and effective government could potentiate a better regulatory framework. In what 
concerns to their correlation with the government debt, it is clear that they are low 
correlated but highly statistically significant. The governance indicators should have 
negative coefficients yet, that does not verify for all of them. However, as the seminal 
work of Kaufmann et al (1999a) argue, there might be some determinants of 
government debt which are not accounted that could invert this positive causal 
relationship. Therefore, this correlation does not mean that better governance impairs a 
reduction on government debt, as shown in this research. Macroeconomic variables are 
relatively low correlated with the dependent variable; however, Inflation (LOG_INF) is 
negatively correlated with government debt which contradicts some of the existing 
literature. As Cooray et al (2017) present, high inflation is related with higher 
government due to a rise in interest payments and thereby increasing the stock of debt. 
Table III shows the results for the estimations using panel Fixed Effects and the 
system General Method of Moments (GMM) for the full sample of countries. Thus, the 
results will be reported and interpreted for both estimation methods. The regressions 
present the basic model in order to access if government debt is reduced in the presence 
of better governance quality. The results for FE estimation (in column 1) in part confirm 
the Hypothesis 1 in the sense that Control of Corruption (CC) and Political Stability 
(PS) have negative coefficients and are statistically significant. Also, the Regulatory 
Quality index presents a negative relation with the dependent variable as previously 
expected but is not statistically significant. De facto, all three governance dimensions 
seem to influence each other. Economic and political stability is closely tight with a 












  LOG_GovDebt LOG_GGFCE LOG_INF LOG_GDP LOG_GFCF LOG_UNEM AGE TRADE CC GE RQ PS RL VA 
LOG_GovDebt 1 
             
LOG_GGFCE 0.0838*** 1 
            
LOG_INF 0.0680*** 0.2879*** 1 
           
LOG_GDP 0.1625*** 0.3615*** 0.3475*** 1 
          
LOG_GFCF 0.1960*** 0.0649*** 0.0819*** 0.1698*** 1 
         
LOG_UNEM 0.0370 0.2721*** 0.0014 0.1568*** 0.0583** 1 
        
AGE 0.1296*** 0.2188*** 0.2018*** 0.7818*** 0.2611*** 0.1019*** 1 
       
TRADE -0.0257 0.0967*** 0.1355*** 0.2823*** 0.1307*** 0.0013 0.2651*** 1 
      
CC 0.0643*** 0.4758*** 0.4163*** 0.6998*** 0.1133*** 0.0861*** 0.5036*** 0.2551*** 1 
     
GE 0.0710*** 0.4416*** 0.4256*** 0.7760*** 0.1441*** 0.0855*** 0.6050*** 0.2705*** 0.9410*** 1 
    
RQ 0.0208 0.4302*** 0.4498*** 0.7464*** 0.1030*** 0.1128*** 0.5727*** 0.2675*** 0.8894*** 0.9394*** 1 
   
PS 0.0733*** 0.4027*** 0.3818*** 0.5845*** 0.2114*** 0.0900*** 0.4519*** 0.3672*** 0.7603*** 0.7262*** 0.7073*** 1 
  
RL 0.0651*** 0.4686*** 0.4413*** 0.7270*** 0.1430*** 0.0915*** 0.5356*** 0.2648*** 0.9597*** 0.9582*** 0.9323*** 0.7772*** 1 
 
VA 0.1752*** 0.4284*** 0.3520*** 0.5455*** 0.0285 0.1671*** 0.3938*** 0.1273*** 0.8036*** 0.7958*** 0.8142*** 0.6702*** 0.8269*** 1 









GOVERNMENT DEBT AND GOVERNANCE QUALITY, FULL SAMPLE  
 
      (1)      (2)    (3)     (4) 
METHOD     FE   GMM    FE   GMM 










LOG_GGFCE 0.2135 0.6200*** 0.1589 0.6293*** 
 
(0.2071) (0.0741) (0.2319) (0.0794) 
LOG_INF -0.0512*** -0.0160* -0.0450** -0.0162* 
 
(0.0176) (0.0092) (0.0179) (0.0090) 
LOG_GDP -0.0213 -0.0355 -0.1091 -0.0432 
 
(0.1214) (0.0741) (0.1208) (0.0770) 
LOG_GFCF -0.4920*** 0.1244* -0.5132*** 0.1145 
 
(0.0862) (0.0705) (0.0923) (0.0710) 
LOG_UNEM 0.1493** 0.0552 0.1645** 0.0473 
 
(0.0715) (0.0442) (0.0808) (0.0442) 
AGE 0.0096** -0.0042** 0.0098** -0.0039** 
 
(0.0039) (0.0018) (0.0038) (0.0019) 
TRADE 0.0016** -0.0012*** 0.0015*** -0.0013*** 
 
(0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0003) 
CC -0.1229** -0.0430 ---- ---- 
 
(0.0492) (0.0271) ---- ---- 
GE 0.0744 0.0585** ---- ---- 
 
(0.0645) (0.0253) ---- ---- 
RQ -0.0855 -0.0441* ---- ---- 
 
(0.0560) (0.0231) ---- ---- 
PS -0.0943*** -0.0656*** ---- ---- 
 
(0.0330) (0.0146) ---- ---- 
RL 0.0769 0.0988** ---- ---- 
 
(0.0527) (0.0386) ---- ---- 
VA 0.0471 -0.0498* ---- ---- 
 
(0.0502) (0.0272) ---- ---- 
WGI_INDEX ---- ---- -0.1061** -0.0345* 
 
---- ---- (0.0483) (0.0202) 
Constant 1.2624* -0.1744 1.6898** -0.1414 
 
(0.6675) (0.4146) (0.6715) (0.4300) 
          




 Countries 157 157 157 157 
Note: *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The robust standard 
errors are in parentheses. Dependent variable: logarithm of government debt ratio (% GDP).  




Nevertheless, the results for the remaining governance quality indices do not support 
the Hypothesis 1 since Government Effectiveness (GE), Rule of Law (RL) and Voice 
and Accountability (VA) indices have positive coefficients. Undoubtedly, VA could 
increase government debt in some circumstances. As Schultz & Weingast (2003) 
stressed out, representative institutions of liberal countries can enhance the state’s 
borrowing power. In this way, the access to credit is more easy meaning that despite the 
rise in demand for funds, it won’t result in tax increase due to a policy called “tax 
smoothing”. 
In what concerns to the control variables, the majority of them got the theoretical 
sign expected for estimated coefficients. This effect in part confirms Cecchetti et al 
(2011) findings that ageing is affecting more broadly the industrial countries driving 
their government expenditure upward and their revenue down. Besides, Gross Fixed 
Capital Formation and Inflation estimated coefficient get a negative sign, instead, 
should have got a positive one. As Reinhart & Rogoff (2010a) presented, higher 
inflation can affect countries by reducing the real value of debt stock. For FE model 
TRADE is positive associated with government debt being statistically significant at 
5%. The clarification of this result has to do with some mechanisms through which 
trade openness negatively affects government debt being the reduction of tax collection 
via an increase in income inequalities one of the many examples (Savvides, 1998).  
Also, Inflation positively affects debt in both estimation models. Surely, when kept 
under control (as it happens in the majority of High Income countries), inflation can 
attract debt on much affordable and favourable terms than those countries with higher 
levels (Swamy, 2015a). Likewise, negative coefficient corroborates Al-Marhubi (2000) 
view that governments could create inflation in order to generate seigniorage and, thus, 
reducing debt (according to the theory of optimal taxation). The negative coefficient of 
GFCF can be explained by the inability of attracting new sovereign debt creditors due to 
the disequilibrium on fiscal position of the certain countries (Swamy, 2015a).  
In order to strengthen the validity of the Hypothesis 1, was created an index of 
overall WGI (as previously mention on Methodology section). The results, for both FE 
and GMM estimators (column 3 and 4) seem to suggest the support to our hypothesis, 
meaning that, there is a negative and statistically significant relation between 




governance quality and government debt. Nevertheless, we cannot surely infer that poor 
governance leads to higher debt levels or the inverse.  
To wash out possible distortions and to obtain more consistent and reliable results 
the sample is split between Low Income and High Income countries and the results are 
presented in Table IV. The results from GMM estimation (in column 2 and 4) shows 
that the interaction governance quality and government debt differ whenever referring 
to Low Income or High Income countries. By this we mean that improvements in some 
governance parameters seem to be associated with lower levels of public debt. Political 
Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism and Voice and Accountability indexes 
have negative coefficients and are statistically significant at 5% and 1%, respectively. 
These results are in line with the ones of Woo (2003) which specifies that public deficits 
tend to be smaller in countries with better institutional procedures.  However, Rule of 
Law show every sign of being statistically significant and positively associated with 
public debt (for FE model this do not apply). As shown by Weingast (2009), Low 
Income countries normally require some reforms on their institutions and rule of law 
system. These reforms aim to dismantle natural states of privilege and rents (which are a 
tool for controlling violence and disorder) but, in the end, threaten to make the society 
worse off. Therefore, societies of poor countries tend to resist to them and hundreds of 
billions are spent in improving rule of law system with few results at sight.  
The results reported for control variables from Low Income countries are consistent 
with existing literature. Per capita income seems to have a negative coefficient (and 
statistically significant) suggesting that the higher GDP per capita, lower will be the 
government debt ratio. In what concerns to the negative coefficient obtained on Trade 
Openness, accordingly to Combes & Saadi-Sedik (2006), for a certain level of trade 
instability more open economies are likely to have higher budget deficits due to a higher 
exposure to external shocks. Authors also state that it may influence negatively public 
debt directly via a decrease in government revenues in short-term (when more trade 
activity comes from a decrease in tariffs). Notwithstanding the foregoing, Age 
Dependency ratio is a little muddled, still, exits some explanations for the outcomes. 
Cecchetti et al (2011) pointed out that the impact of ageing on real interest rates are 
controversial. Ageing has an ambiguous effect on capital intensity: despite the reduction 




of the growth of young cohort could lead to an increase in the rates of returns, there is a 
direct effect on interest rates (Krueger & Ludwig, 2007). 
TABLE IV 
 GOVERNANCE QUALITY IN LOW INCOME AND HIGH INCOME COUNTRIES 
        (1)         (2)         (3)               (4) 
 
      LOW INCOME        LOW INCOME        HIGH INCOME        HIGH INCOME 
METHOD         FE        GMM           FE        GMM 










LOG_GGFCE -0.3812 0.0709 0.9590*** 1.1335*** 
 
(0.2821) (0.1526) (0.2232) (0.2262) 
LOG_INF -0.0849** -0.0002 -0.0498** 0.0022 
 
(0.0356) (0.0211) (0.0198) (0.0116) 
LOG_GDP -1.6949*** -1.0189*** 0.2894 0.3550*** 
 
(0.4989) (0.3164) (0.2417) (0.1270) 
LOG_GFCF -0.0680 -0.0149 -0.3911 0.0850 
 
(0.1612) (0.0976) (0.3111) (0.1638) 
LOG_UNEM 0.0420 -0.1865 0.1036 0.1708* 
 
(0.1435) (0.1248) (0.1985) (0.0973) 
AGE -0.0069 -0.0198*** 0.0220** 0.0029 
 
(0.0136) (0.0074) (0.0094) (0.0077) 
TRADE 0.0029*** 0.0009** 0.0015 -0.0009 
 
(0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0010) (0.0007) 
CC 0.0297 -0.0773 -0.0085 0.0078 
 
(0.1502) (0.1124) (0.0709) (0.0305) 
GE 0.0406 0.0677 -0.1359 0.0392 
 
(0.1684) (0.1435) (0.1171) (0.0291) 
RQ -0.2213 0.0207 -0.1548* -0.0558 
 
(0.1782) (0.1025) (0.0885) (0.0507) 
PS -0.1638** -0.1660** -0.0820 -0.0319 
 
(0.0673) (0.0658) (0.0763) (0.0355) 
RL -0.0395 0.3128** 0.0277 0.0606 
 
(0.1325) (0.1312) (0.1297) (0.0631) 
VA 0.1846* -0.1972*** 0.1668 0.0192 
 
(0.0976) (0.0696) (0.1509) (0.0360) 
Constant 7.7021*** 5.5936*** -1.4387 -2.7682*** 
 
(2.7175) (1.6100) (1.2735) (0.5927) 




 Countries 25 25 47 47 
       Note: *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The robust standard errors 
are in parentheses. Dependent variable: logarithm of government debt ratio (% GDP). Column (1) and (2) refers to Low Income 
countries regressions; column (3) and (4) refers to High Income countries regressions.   




 The depletion of young population causes a reduction on labour supply in the future 
leading to labour scarcity in relation to capital. Thus, increases capital-to-labour ratios 
and hence interest rates fall. This descendent pressure on real interest rates at world 
level might benefit government debt through a reduction on interest payments.  
Relatively to High Income countries, none of the WGI are statistically significant. 
This result gives support to our Hypothesis 2 – the link between good governance 
quality and government debt reduction is more evident for Low Income countries. Our 
results also meet the existing literature in the sense that Mausch et al (2016) found 
evidence that strong institutions have an important role in debt effect on growth. 
Actually, the majority of governance indicators (for GMM estimations) have positive 
coefficients yet not significant. For the positive (but not significant) coefficient of 
Control of Corruption index, Gupta et al (2002) states that as per capita GDP is a robust 
determinant of corruption and, once included in the regression, reduces the explanatory 
power of corruption index. Rothstein & Teorell (2008) also points that countries with 
low levels of corruption tend to be associated with greater government size. 
Furthermore, Government Effectiveness positive coefficient can also be explained. La 
Porta et al (1999) found that governments’ performance is in part affected by legal 
origin, ethnolinguistic heterogeneity, etc, and, more important, found that larger 
governments perform better. Better performing governments can be linked with more 
expenses from a larger government size, thus, higher public debt. Nevertheless, 
Regulatory Quality and Political Stability ensure a positive impact on government debt.  
Indeed, for FE model, Regulatory Quality is statistically significant at 10% suggesting 
that government debt decreases 0,15% with one unit increase in the mentioned index.  
Concerning the results for the control variables mentioned above, they have the 
theoretical expected signs being the lagged Government Debt, General Government 
Final Consumption Expenditure, Trade Openness and Unemployment statically 
significant at 1% and 10% level. As Reinhart & Rogoff (2009) denoted on their work, 
government spending tends to rise by a lot on the years after a banking/financial crisis 
in an attempt to fight the recession as happen in some of High Income countries (e.g. 
Portugal, Spain, Ireland, Greece, etc.). Notwithstanding, per capita income seems to be 
statistically significant but with a positive coefficient. It is known that several High 
Income countries, during and after the crisis of 2008, suffered from low economic 




growth rates. Public debt and slow economic growth are synchronously related, yet this 
relation is not linear accordingly to Reinhart et al (2012). The authors state that the 
majority of high debt events coincide with low economic growth times. Also, Krugman 
(2010) goes even further and says that causation can sometimes run from growth to debt 
as happen with Japan few years ago. More surprising, Swamy (2015b) found evidence 
that GDP growth has a significant negative effect on debt. Finnaly, Roubini & Sachs 
(1989)9 noted that large budget deficits could result from economic growth slowdown 
and high unemployment. It is evident that after the financial crises, governments of 
these countries had some difficulties in dealing with social security and public safety 
needs by public finances. This corroborates the historical phenomena upward trend on 
unemployment rate which is seen after a banking or financial crisis according to 
Reinhart & Rogoff (2009) research. Lastly, GGFCE have a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient at 1% level for both FE and GMM specification models. This 
goes in the line with Leão (2013) research which argues that, using a Keynesian 
framework and under full employment, public debt ratio could be reduced with a rise in 
government spending. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The majority of the literature focused on the relation between public debt and 
economic growth. In what concerns to the governance and government debt nexus the 
same does not apply. Little has been discussed about this issue, however, still exists 
some literature which explores the impact of corruption on government debt levels and 
budget deficits. So, this study aims to ascertain whether and to what extent all six-
dimension governance quality indicators (WGI) affect government debt thresholds.  
A panel data analysis is carried out using fixed effects (FE) and generalized method 
of moments (GMM) estimation for a set of 164 countries on a period between 2002 and 
2015. The estimation results for FE model suggest that Control of Corruption (CC) and 
Voice and Accountability (VA) indexes are negative and statistically significant on 
influencing government debt. In part, this result confirms our Hypothesis 1 that better 
governance quality is associated with lower levels of public debt.  
                                                 
9 Authors found evidence for OECD countries for the period after 1973. 




For robustness purposes, estimation results are presented for two other specification 
models: for Low Income countries and for High Income countries group. The sample is 
divided into these two sets of countries with 25 and 47 countries, respectively. The 
results are robust in the sense that, for GMM estimation model, Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence/Terrorism (PS) and Voice and Accountability (VA) indexes are 
negative and statistically significant for Low Income countries. Therefore, can be 
argued that Hypothesis 2 is partially supported, only when we claim that Low Income 
countries have a better performance on government debt accumulation with an 
improved governance quality. The main contribution of this study is also related with 
the fact that results also suggest that improving governance is more beneficial for 
countries with lower levels of per capita income when comparing with high income 
ones.  
Following the aforementioned, we can conclude that there is a positive association 
concerning government debt levels and institutional and regulatory quality of the 
country. This fact may derive some policy implications in the sense that government 
institutions and international economic organizations should sought to pin down sound 
policies with regard to strengthen governance quality. Policies that promote a better 
government environment may lead to a soaring economic growth and public debt 
sustainability. 
In what concerns to the limitations, the study faced some such as a restrained time 
span availability for WGI variables (which only exists annually since 2002) and the lack 
of economic data for some countries (which could have enlarged the dataset dimension). 
The fact that WGI only captures “perceptions” measures which are based on surveys 
may constrain the present study.  
For future research, the impact of politics on the interaction between government 
debt and governance can be explored. Political polarization as Roubini & Sachs (1989) 
and Alesina & Perotti (1995) refer, have an important role on government debt 
dynamic. Moreover, in order to better reckon debt-governance relation, analysing the 
impact of the banking and financial crisis of 2008 could develop another field of studies 
and pertinent results, especially when looking for the most plagued European countries 
(PIIGS). 
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LIST OF COUNTRIES USED IN THE FULL AND ADJUSTED SAMPLES, AND THEIR 
CLASSIFICATION 
SUB-SAMPLE                   
LOW INCOME 
COUNTRIES 
Afghanistan, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Rep., Chad, Comoros, Congo 
Dem. Rep., Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mali, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Tanzania, 
Togo, Uganda, Zimbabwe 
HIGH INCOME 
COUNTRIES 
Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belgium, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, 
Chile, Cyprus, Czech Rep., Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea Rep., Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, 
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